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NOTE
REMITTITUR AND THE SEVENTH

AMENDMENT

Plaintiff sued to recover damages for breach of contract.
After a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the trial judge
granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
entered a judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed
and the United States Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit, reversed and
remanded the case to the district court ordering a remittitur, or if
the plaintiff refused, a new trial limited to the issue of damages.,
Upon remand the defendants in district court filed a motion to
reopen the record for admission of additional evidence to be considered by the court in determining the amount of remittitur.
The district court held, (1) the seventh amendment does not permit the court to hear additional evidence in order to set the
amount of the remittitur; and (2) even if such a procedure were
constitutional, the trial court, as a matter of discretion, should
refuse to do so. Glazer v. Glazer, 274 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. La.
1967).
The seventh amendment provides:
"In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law."
The argument which claims that remittitur is per se unconstitutional when used in conjunction with a jury trial is that the
court's reduction of the damages set by a jury involves a reexamination of facts tried by a jury, a practice that did not exist
at common law when the seventh amendment was adopted. However, the federal courts, since Mr. Justice Story's opinion in
Blunt v. Little,2 have permitted the use of remittitur. The most
recent United States Supreme Court case in the area is Dimick
v. Schiedt.3 It primarily concerned the use of additur which it
held to be unconstitutional, but dictum suggested that the use of
remittitur should also be restricted:
"In the light reflected by the foregoing review of English de1. Glazer v. Glazer, 374 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1967).
2. 3 Mason 102 (Mass. 1822).
3. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). The decision was 5-4 with Chief Justice Hughes,
Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone dissenting.
[706]
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cisions and commentators, it therefore may be that if the
question of remittitur were now before us for the first time,
it would be decided otherwise. But, first announced by Mr.
Justice Story in 1822, the doctrine has been accepted as the
law for more than a hundred years and uniformly applied in
the federal courts during that time. And, as it finds some
support in the practice of the English courts prior to the
adoption of the Constitution, we may assume that in a case
involving a remittitur, which this case does not, the doctrine
would not be reconsidered or disturbed at this late day. Nevertheless, this court in a very special sense is charged with
the duty of construing and upholding the Constitution; and in
the discharge of that important duty, it ever must be alert to
see that a doubtful precedent be not extended by mere analogy
to a different case if the result will be to weaken or subvert
what it conceives to be a principle of the fundamental law of
the land.' ' 4 (Emphasis added.)
Glazer presented a question of first instance. The defendants
sought to introduce additional evidence both with respect to
events "which [were] occurring or had occurred at the time of
trial, and evidence of events which occurred after the trial."
They contended that the district court had the power to hear such
evidence and that the court of appeals "intended to permit this
court, during the remittitur proceedings, to hear additional evidence on the damage issue." 6 They therefore urged the court to
"exercise its discretion by hearing additional evidence." 7
In denying this motion the court in Glazer took several distinct tacks. First it entered into a penetrating discussion of the
court of appeal's mandate to the lower court whereby the higher
court remanded the case for a remittitur or possible new trial.
It detailed the choice of words used by the court of appeals and
listed the several ambiguous passages which might support the
defendant's motion. It concluded that if the Fifth Circuit had
wished to direct the trial court to consider additional evidence
it would have expressly done so as it has done in previous cases. s
It also pointed out that what the defendant's motion sought to do
was something quite distinct from a pre-trial hearing to determine if there is enough new evidence for a new trial.
4. 293 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1935).
5. 274 F. Supp. 471, 472 (E.D. La. 1967).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. DuBreuil v. -Stevenson, 369 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Theriot v. Mercer,
262 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1959).
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Next the court discussed the constitutionality of remittitur
under the seventh amendment. Relying on the dictum quoted
above from Dimick it concluded that although remittitur itself
is still constitutional it is nevertheless a borderline device and its
use should not be extended by analogy. Since the defendant's motion if granted would result in an extension of the use of remittitur this extension by analogy was denied as being unconstitutional. Even assuming the constitutionality of the extension, the
court held that it would still exercise its discretion to deny the
motion, because to grant the motion would not commend itself to
"orderly judicial procedure."' As the court stated earlier, "the
purpose of permitting the remittitur is to avoid holding a new
trial."1° Yet if the defendants' motion were allowed it would result in a partial new trial before the plaintiff was given the
choice of remittitur or a new trial.
Of these three general areas-the mandate interpretation,
the constitutional issue, and the court's discretion in the matter
-this writer only takes issue with the constitutional question.
There are several ways to approach the general constitutional
issue. The easiest solution would be to find that the device of remittitur was in use in common law practice in 1791. But finding
a pattern concerning how the civil jury was protected is a very
elusive task. The reporting of cases lacked the detail of today's
methods. This difficulty was compounded by the wide variance
which existed between the practices employed by the different
states at the time.1 The record is at best equivocal, and often old
forms of procedure cannot be matched exactly with modern practice. The evidence as to the exact common law procedure in use
then is not sufficient to be conclusive.
The material available from this period is at least clear
enough to reflect the general concern which led to the enactment
of the seventh amendment. One can piece together why a specific
preservation of civil jury trial was favored by several of our
early statesmen. 12 One argument advanced for protecting the use
of jury trial, as put forth in the Federalist-Antifederalist de9. 274 F. Supp. 471., 478 (E.D. La. 1967).
10. 274 F. Supp. 471, 475 (E.D. La. 1967).
11. Henderson, Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289 (1966).
12. See generally M. BORDEN, THiE ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS 1965; J. ELLIOTT, THE DEBATES IN

THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (reprint

1937) ; A.

OF THE ADOPTION OF

KOCH, JEFFERSON AND MADISON,

THE GREAT COLLABORATION (1964); J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (reprint 1965); 1 J. MADISON, WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 1769-1793 (1895).
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bates, was that civil jury trial protected against corrupt judges.
Evidently it was felt that it would be more difficult for one of
the two opposing parties in litigation to influence the jury than
to influence the judge, if for no other reason than it would involve more people. Secondly, many colonial personalities, such as
Jefferson, who felt so strongly about adopting a bill of rights,
believed that the civil jury trial was a safeguard which protected
poorer classes of the population from oppression. 14 The assumption was that judges generally came from the upper social level
and, whether consciously or not, would tend to favor the upper
class in their judgments. If these are the general purposes behind the seventh, it must now be asked whether the use of remittitur would violate the spirit of the amendment. Is it a tool
by which the judge can defeat the jury?

Before answering this question it must be noted that there
are two important but separate functions that a jury performs
in a damage case. First, the jury decides which of the opposing
parties is liable. Then secondly, it must determine the amount of
damages. Remittitur cannot interfere with the first function as
its use does not enable the judge to find for the other party. In
the second area, remittitur definitely does affect the jury's verdict, but can it be said to unfairly injure either party? The plaintiff has the option of accepting the remittitur or proceeding with
a new trial. To a degree the additional time and money required
for a new trial plus the chance that a new jury will find for a
lesser amount or even for the other party will militate against
his exercising this option. Thus his right to a jury trial could be
impaired to some extent. But it is submitted that this restriction
is no more severe than devices used by the court in controlling
the information which goes to the jury, such as the admission
and exclusion of evidence or other devices, such as judgments
n.o.v. or new trials, which take the case out of the jury's hands
altogether. Thus the plaintiff should not be heard to complain
when he accepts the remittitur because his freedom to elect a
new trial is not unduly restricted.
One writer has suggested that remittitur is unconstitutional
13. J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
630 (reprint 1966).
14. Letter from T. Jefferson to J. Madison, July 31, 1788, from WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON

445 (Ford ed. 1892-1899). Address by Luther Martin, Legis-

lature of the State of Maryland, reprinted from ELLIOT 1, 380-82.
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not because it interferes with the right of the plaintiff, but
rather because it interferes with the defendant's right to a jury
trial.'15 This seems doubtful, if it is accepted that the general
purpose of the seventh amendment is to avoid the possibility of
any corruption or unconscious oppression on the part of the judiciary, as outlined above, and that the jury provides the necessary buffer. From the defendant's viewpoint the use of remittitur does not circumvent this general policy because the court's
action is more favorable to the defendant's case than was the
jury's since it reduces the amount awarded to the plaintiff by
the jury. Thus reconsidered, remittitur per se is constitutional.
Likewise if one were to allow additional evidence as requested in
Glazer, the purposes behind the seventh amendment would not
be abridged. Therefore, this writer does not agree with the court
in Glazer that if the motion made by defendants were granted,
that the resulting procedure would be unconstitutional.
The constitutional issue might have been decided differently
in Glazer if Dimick had never been decided. It seems that the decision in Dimick is unfortunate because the Supreme Court is
inconsistent in trying to differentiate between remittitur which
remains constitutional and additur which is declared unconstitutional. It tried to distinguish remittitur as the mere "lopping
off" of what the jury has already found, from additur, which it
classified as a "bald addition." The argument was weak and the
commentators uniformly rejected it, even those who felt that
remittitur was unconstitutional."' Dimick severely crippled the
numerous earlier cases which upheld the opposite trend,1' 7 but it
has never been overruled and it is still the latest expression in
the remittitur-additur area. All things considered, it is not surprising that the court in Glazer felt bound by Dimick when presented with the issue of extending remittitur. It is submitted,
however, that a reevaluation of Dimick by the United States Supreme Court is warranted.
Despite the controversial constitutional issue, this writer
15. Carlin, RairriTURS AND ADDITURS, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 1, 15 (1911).
16. F. JAMES, CrvIL PROCEDURE 315 (1965).
17. Gasoline Prod. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) ; Ex parte
Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920) ; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) ;
Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593 (1897) ; Arkansas Valley
Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69 (1889) ; Northern Pac. R.R. v. Hebert,
116 U.S. 642 (1886) ; Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830) ; Blunt
v. Little, 3 Mason 102 (Mass. 1822).
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believes that the result reached by the court in Glazer is the
correct one. The court's thorough review and interpretation of
the upper court's mandate is very convincing. Likewise the
court's exercise of discretion in denying the defendants' motion
preserves the procedural device of remittitur for the limited
task for which it is designed without destroying its effectiveness
as an efficient alternative to a new trial with a jury.
Lawrence N. Brown

